Dial One for Scam: A Large-Scale Analysis of Technical Support Scams by Miramirkhani, Najmeh et al.
Dial One for Scam:
A Large-Scale Analysis of Technical Support Scams
Najmeh Miramirkhani
Stony Brook University
nmiramirkhani@cs.stonybrook.edu
Oleksii Starov
Stony Brook University
ostarov@cs.stonybrook.edu
Nick Nikiforakis
Stony Brook University
nick@cs.stonybrook.edu
Abstract—In technical support scams, cybercriminals attempt
to convince users that their machines are infected with malware
and are in need of their technical support. In this process, the
victims are asked to provide scammers with remote access to their
machines, who will then “diagnose the problem”, before offering
their support services which typically cost hundreds of dollars.
Despite their conceptual simplicity, technical support scams are
responsible for yearly losses of tens of millions of dollars from
everyday users of the web.
In this paper, we report on the first systematic study of
technical support scams and the call centers hidden behind them.
We identify malvertising as a major culprit for exposing users
to technical support scams and use it to build an automated
system capable of discovering, on a weekly basis, hundreds of
phone numbers and domains operated by scammers. By allowing
our system to run for more than 8 months we collect a large
corpus of technical support scams and use it to provide insights
on their prevalence, the abused infrastructure, the illicit profits,
and the current evasion attempts of scammers. Finally, by setting
up a controlled, IRB-approved, experiment where we interact
with 60 different scammers, we experience first-hand their social
engineering tactics, while collecting detailed statistics of the
entire process. We explain how our findings can be used by
law-enforcing agencies and propose technical and educational
countermeasures for helping users avoid being victimized by
technical support scams.
I. INTRODUCTION
A recent and understudied social engineering attack tar-
geting everyday web users is a technical support scam. In a
technical support scam, a webpage created by the scammer
tries to convince users that their machines are infected with
malware and instructs them to call a technical support center
for help with their infection. The victimized users will then
willingly provide remote access to their machine and, if the
scammer successfully convinces them that they are indeed
infected, pay the scammer a malware-removal fee in the range
of hundreds of dollars. This scam has become so prevalent
that the Internet Crime Complaint Center released a Public
Service Announcement in November 2014 warning users about
technical support scams [1].
Even though this type of scam costs users millions of
dollars on a yearly basis [1], [2], there has been no systematic
study of technical support scams from the security community.
Thus, while today we know that these scams do in fact take
place and that scammers are successfully defrauding users, any
details about their operations are collected in an unsystematic
way, e.g., by victimized users recalling their experiences, and
antivirus companies analyzing a handful of scams in an ad-hoc
fashion [3]–[5].
In this paper, we perform a three-pronged analysis of
the increasingly serious problem of technical support scams.
First, we build a reliable, distributed crawling infrastructure
that can identify technical support scam pages and use it to
collect technical support scam pages from websites known
to participate in malvertising activities. By deploying this
infrastructure, in a period of 250 days, we discover 8,698 unique
domain names involved in technical support scams, claiming
that users are infected and urging them to call one of the
1,581 collected phone numbers. To the best of our knowledge,
our system is the first one that can automatically discover
hundreds of domains and numbers belonging to technical
support scammers every week, without relying on manual labor
or crowdsourcing, which appear to be the main methods of
collecting instances of technical support scams used by the
industry [3], [4].
Second, we analyze the corpus of collected data and find
multiple patterns and trends about the techniques used and
the infrastructure abused by scammers. Among others, we
find that scammers register thousands of low-cost domain
names, such as, .xyz and .space, which abuse trademarks
of large software companies and, in addition, abuse CDNs as
a means of obtaining free hosting for their scams. We trace
the collected phone numbers and find that while 15 different
telecommunication providers are abused, four of them are
responsible for more than 90% of the numbers. We show
that scammers are actively evading dynamic-analysis systems
located on public clouds and find that, even though the average
lifetime of a scam URL is approximately 11 days, 43% of
the domains were only pointing to scams for less than 3 days.
Moreover, we identify potential campaigns of technical support
scams, their unique characteristics, and estimate their life time
finding that 69% of scam campaigns have a lifetime of less
than 50 days, yet some survive for the entire duration of our
experiment. From a financial perspective, we take advantage
of publicly exposed webserver analytics and estimate that, just
for a small fraction of the monitored domains, scammers are
likely to have made more than 9 million dollars.
Third, we obtain permission from our IRB to conduct
60 sessions with technical support scammers, where we call
the numbers discovered by our distributed infrastructure and
give scammers access to disposable virtual machines, while
recording the entire session. By analyzing the collected data, we
calculate precise statistics about the abused tools, the utilized
social engineering techniques, and the requested charges.
Among others, we find that scammers are patient (average
call duration is 17 minutes), abuse a limited number of remote
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administration tools (81% of all scammers used one of two
software tools), charge victims hundreds of dollars (average
charge is $290.9), and are creative in their ways of convincing
users that their machines are infected with a virus (more than 12
different techniques utilized). Moreover, we use a large number
of volunteers to estimate the size of call centers operated by
scammers and find that the average call center is housing 11
technical support scammers, ready to receive calls from victims.
Finally, we explain why educating the general public about
technical support scams should be easier than educating them
about other security issues, and propose the development of
an, in-browser, “panic button” that non-technical users would
be educated to use when they feel threatened by the content
of any given webpage.
Our main contributions are:
• We design and develop the first system capable of
automatically discovering domains and phone numbers
operated by technical support scammers.
• We perform the first systematic analysis of technical
support scam pages and identify their techniques,
abused infrastructure, and campaigns.
• We interact in a controlled fashion with 60 scammers
and collect intelligence that can be used for takedowns,
technical countermeasures, and public education.
• We make a series of propositions for educating the
public about technical support scams and for protecting
users from abusive pages.
II. BACKGROUND
A technical support scam begins with a user landing on
a page claiming that her operating system is infected with
malware. Pages hosting technical support scams typically abuse
logos and trademarks of popular software and security compa-
nies, or operating system UIs, to increase their trustworthiness.
Figure 1 shows an example scam page. Instead of requesting
from users to download software, as typical scareware scams
did in the past [6], these scams request from the users to
call a support center for help with their infection. The posted
number is often a toll-free number which is clearly used to
increase the chances that a user would actually dial it. Finally,
the page is using intrusive JavaScript techniques in order to
make it hard for the user to navigate away, such as, constantly
showing alert boxes that ask the user to call the technical
support number, and hooking into the onunload event, which
is triggered when the user attempts to close the current browser
tab, or navigate away from the current website.
Once a user calls the listed number, she will eventually reach
a person requesting access to her machine in order to diagnose
the problem. The user is instructed to download remote desktop
software and allow the remote “technician” to connect to her
machine. After connecting, the scammer, unfortunately, has
full control over the user’s machine. The scammer will then
proceed to demonstrate the infection by showing errors and
supposed problems that, in reality, are typical of any Windows
installation. As soon as the scammer realizes that the user
is convinced, he will then offer to fix the problem for a fee,
typically in the range of hundreds of dollars which the user is
asked to pay by giving her credit card number to the scammer.
As one can clearly understand, the above scenario will, at best,
Fig. 1: Screenshot of a technical support scam which mimics a
Windows blue-screen-of-death to increase its trustworthiness.
result in the user paying hundreds of dollars for unnecessary
services. At worst, the scammer can keep charging the credit
card until the limit is reached, install malware and keystroke
loggers on the user’s machine, and use them to exfiltrate the
user’s private and financial information [7].
III. DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS
A. Source of technical support scam pages
Even though technical support scams are a known phe-
nomenon, the exact details of how a user ends up on a technical
support scam page are less known. In order to study this
phenomenon, we need access to a steady stream of URLs
with high toxicity, similar to the needs of dynamic analysis
frameworks for the detection of drive-by downloads [8].
We argue that most users are exposed to malicious content
via malvertising. The constant stream of news of malvertising
detected on popular websites [9]–[11], and the constant
crackdown (and promises of crackdown) from advertising
networks [12]–[14] make this clear. Therefore, even though a
scammer could, in theory, try to lure individual users to click
on direct links towards his scam pages, this behavior will not
only result in a reduced number of victims but also in the faster
identification and thus takedown of the malicious page. The
natural non-determinism of advertising networks and the ability
to trace the provenance of the current visitor, provide ample
opportunities for scammers to reveal themselves to victims
while hiding from search engines and security researchers.
In this paper, we take advantage of the results of specific
recent studies which found that two types of services, namely,
domain parking and ad-based URL shorteners, engage in
malvertising practices that endanger users.
Domain Parking. Domain parking companies compile port-
folios of tens of thousands of underdeveloped domain names
which they use to show ads to the landing users. If a user clicks
on an ad, the domain parking company will then, presumably,
give a portion of the advertising profit to the owner of the
unused domain. Apart from hiding advertising profits from the
domain owners [15], many domain parking companies have
been found to collaborate with dubious advertising networks
which do not hesitate to occasionally redirect a user to a
page with malware. In fact, Vissers et al., while researching
the types of ads that users who land on parked websites are
exposed to, discovered two pages which fit our definition of
a technical support scam [16]. To find a sufficient number of
parked domains that our crawlers can visit, we take advantage
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of the fact that prior research has shown that domain parking is
the favorite monetization method of domain squatters [17]–[22].
Therefore, as long as we visit typosquatting variants of popular
domain names, such as twwitter.com (note the duplication of
the ‘‘w’’ character), the majority of our visits will end up on
domain parking companies which will redirect a fraction of
these visits to technical support scams.
Ad-based URL Shorteners. Ad-based URL shorteners are
services that allow the users who shorten URLs to make a
commission every time that other users visit their shortened
URLs. Instead of immediately redirecting the short-URL-
visiting users, ad-based URL shorteners force users to view
an ad for a few seconds, before they can proceed to the
intended, “long”, URL. Nikiforakis et al. studied the ecosystem
of ad-based URL shortening services and their ad-delivery
methods [23], finding a large percentage of malvertising.
Generality of our approach. Note that we are not claiming
that scammers explicitly collaborate with either domain-parking
agencies, or ad-based URL shorteners. Instead, we use these
two services as our gateway to malicious advertising, rather
than as a method for identifying specific advertisers. As such,
we argue that our methodology will be able to detect, with
equal probability, all scammers that are using advertising as a
way of attracting victims.
B. Tool design and implementation
Our tool for discovering and recording technical support
scams is called ROBOVIC (Robotic Victim). Our main objective
is to collect as much data as possible about this highly profitable
underground business, in order to conduct a systematic study of
technical support scams and analyze their unique characteristics.
At the same time, a necessary condition for gathering technical-
support-related data is the development of a reliable and highly
available infrastructure, that will provide us with enough uptime
to be able to study temporal properties of technical support
scams. Figure 2 shows the high-level view of ROBOVIC, the
high-toxicity, input streams of URLs, and the interactions of our
tool with the technical support scam ecosystem. We describe
ROBOVIC’s core components below:
Crawler. The Crawler is in charge of browsing and collecting
data for the given set of URLs and recording information
about the resulting pages. To address the requirements of our
study, we extended OpenWPM which is a generic web privacy
measurement platform [24]. More specifically, we implemented
a custom browser extension to instrument the browser so that
specific native JavaScript functions, like the aforementioned
alert function, would be overwritten before loading a page, in
a way that allows us to record the frequency of calls and exact
messages displayed to users. In addition, our browser extension
ensured the modification of the browser’s user-agent properties
to match a typical user browsing the web using a Microsoft
Windows OS. ROBOVIC uses a MITM proxy to record requests
and responses, clicks on pop ups and logs the HTML code
of all the nested iframes, the final URL, the text shown in
alert boxes and the functions used in commonly abused event
handlers, such as, the onunload handler, as well as a screenshot
of the page. Finally, given the adversarial nature of technical
support scam pages, e.g., the locking of a user’s browser via
the use of the JavaScript-accessible, browser-provided alert
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Fig. 2: High level view of our automated detection and collection
tool of technical support scams (ROBOVIC) and its interaction with
the technical support scam ecosystem
function, we developed our crawler in such a way that allows
it to interact with these pages but not get trapped by them.
We deployed the ROBOVIC Crawler on three different sites
(our campus, Amazon’s Elastic Compute Cloud [25], and on
Linode’s cloud [26]). We provided each instance with the
same set of 10,000 possible typosquatting domains, which we
obtained by applying the typosquatting models of Wang et
al. [18] on the top 200 websites according to Alexa, and a set
of 3,000 shortened URLs belonging to ten popular ad-based
URL shorteners. The crawler instances initiate the crawling
process at the same time each day and collect and store all
the aforementioned data. Note that ROBOVIC was originally
relying just on domain parking in order to find technical support
scams and we incorporated ad-based URL shorteners later in
our study. We denote the exact date while analyzing the data
in Section IV.
Detector. The Detector Module identifies the pages that are
the most likely to be technical support scams based on a set of
heuristic rules. We examined several heuristics, such as, having
a redirection chain, showing consecutive alert dialogues, the
presence of a phone number, and the presence of special
keywords. After observing approximately a week’s worth of
collected data, we designed our heuristic which minimized false
negatives and false positives as follows: If a page has any kind
of popup dialogue, we check its content using an empirically
constructed decision tree and based on the presence of carefully
chosen sets of keywords, we score the page and mark it as
malicious if the score is higher than a tuned threshold.
To gauge the accuracy of our heuristic, we use random
sampling to select three days (from the 250 days that are
crawlers are active) and manually analyze all page screenshots
collected by ROBOVIC (17K screenshots), during those days.
Through this process, we verified that our heuristic was able
to capture all technical support scams collected by ROBOVIC.
Interestingly, we identified some scam pages that would use
HTML to draw fake alert boxes when a user visited them. Our
heuristic, however, can still detect them as they switch back to
the native JavaScript alerts when the user attempts to navigate
away from the page (aiming to trap the user on the same page).
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Fig. 3: Number of unique weekly technical support scam domains
(top) and phone numbers(bottom) recorded by each ROBOVIC instance
during our 36-week monitored period. The vertical line denotes the
week on which we adopted an extra source of malvertising pages,
namely, that of shortened URLs.
This manual inspection makes us confident that our heuristic
can account for most, if not all, of the technical support scams
that ROBOVIC was exposed to during the monitored period.
Liveness Checker. The Liveness Checker is the final com-
ponent of ROBOVIC which is responsible for tracking the
lifetime of a scam page after it first appears in the crawler’s
feed. Every URL that the Liveness Checker receives from the
Detector component, is added in a database of URLs that will
be crawled on a daily basis. In addition, for every URL received,
the Liveness Checker computes neighboring URLs that could
be hosting a technical support scam page, e.g., removing GET
parameters from a URL and iteratively reducing the resource-
path until we reach the main page of a domain. On any given
day, a scam is considered to be “alive” if any of the above
URLs responds with a page that matches our aforementioned
scam-page heuristic. The lifetime of any given scam domain
is the longest time period, in terms of days, that began and
ended with a page marked as a technical support scam. We
chose this definition to account for transient errors (support
scam goes offline for one day) and for malvertising variance
(same domain can first show a support scam, then a survey
scam [27], and then again a support scam).
IV. DATA ANALYSIS
In this section, we report on the data collected by ROBOVIC
during a 36-week period, starting from September 1, 2015.
ROBOVIC attempted to resolve 8.4 million domains and
collected a total of 15TB worth of crawling data.
A. Discovered scams
Of the 5 million domains resolved by ROBOVIC, 22K URLs
were detected as technical support scam pages, belonging
to 8,698 unique domains. Figure 3 (top) shows the weekly
number of unique domains found by each of our three deployed
ROBOVIC instances during our data-collecting period. One can
see that, as time passes, technical support scams are becoming
increasingly common reaching more than 1,000 unique domains
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Fig. 4: Venn diagram of Unique Phone Numbers Detected by ROBOVIC
instances
per week in April and May 2016. Interestingly, phone numbers
cannot keep up with that growth (Figure 3, bottom), suggesting
that curbing the abuse of phone numbers will have a significant
effect on technical support scams.
Another visible pattern is the great difference between
the number of scam domains to which our campus-residing
ROBOVIC was exposed, compared to the ROBOVIC instances
located on Amazon’s and Linode’s hosting clouds. Since all
crawlers were asked to crawl the same domains and none of the
three ROBOVIC instances experienced any downtime during our
monitored period, the only reasonable explanation is that the
dubious advertising networks responsible for redirecting a user
from a typosquatting page to a technical support scam page
are using the user’s IP address as a way of straightforwardly
evading crawlers located on popular commercial clouds.
An alternative way of looking at the unique scam domains
discovered, is to consider the individual coverage of each of
our three ROBOVIC instances. In terms of domain names, our
campus-residing ROBOVIC, discovered 95.7% of the domain
names discovered by all three instances, with the Linode- and
Amazon-residing ROBOVIC instances, contributing only 7.6%
of the overall unique domains. Similarly, the same campus-
residing ROBOVIC instance, by itself, discovered 92.8% of
the total number of unique telephone numbers (see Figure 4).
Overall, our results indicate that, because ad networks and
attackers are location-aware, proxy-less servers located on
popular commercial clouds, have only a small contribution
in the discovery of scam pages and phone numbers.
Figure 3 (bottom) shows the number of unique telephone
numbers discovered each day and exhibits a similar behavior
as Figure 3 (top). Comparing the two figures together, one
can see that while telephone numbers and domains are clearly
correlated, the relationship between the two is not a 1-to-
1 relationship. The reason for this is that scams located on
different domains can be showing the same phone number,
as well as the phone number on any given page can change
between page loads. By inspecting some of the JavaScript
code located in such pages, we found evidence of “on-the-fly”,
phone-number delivery.
By analyzing the code we found that scammers are abusing a
pay-per-call management framework called Callpixel (rebranded
as Retreaver). In Pay-per-call marketing, unlike pay-per-click
(PPC) advertising, an advertiser will be charged if the ad visitor
makes a call to a tracked phone number. Retreaver, as a pay-per-
call management framework, can track and tag visitors based on
various features, such as, browser profile, and geolocation, and
provide them with customized toll-free numbers assigned “on-
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the-fly” from a pool of numbers. As the number is only available
to a specific campaign at a specific time, Retreaver can tag
the incoming calls, forward them to the call center configured
for that campaign, and log it to calculate the conversion rate.
10% of the domains in our corpus used variations of JavaScript
code to use the Retreaver API. While this novel marketing
model is designed for legitimate businesses for delivering highly
targeted pay-per-call campaigns, it is abused by the scammers to
generate fresh numbers dynamically. Figure 5, shows a sample
scam snippet which reads browser properties (operating system,
user agent, and language) and calls the Retreaver API to get a
JSON file containing a telephone number.
Lastly, by analyzing the data collected by the Liveness
Detector module of ROBOVIC, we discovered that the lifetime
of scam domains forms a long-tail distribution. Specifically,
27% of the domain names are reachable only for a single day
after they are first discovered by ROBOVIC, while 43% of the
domains are reachable for up to three days. At the same time,
7% of the discovered domains were reachable for more than 40
days indicating that these are successful in avoiding unwanted
attention and take-downs.
B. Domain names
Of the total 8,698 unique scam domains collected by
ROBOVIC, 17% are completely human readable making ex-
tensive use of words that either imitate a legitimate brand, or
attempt to scare the victim. The five most frequently used words
in domains were: techsupport, alert, pc, security, and
windows. 83% of the domains contained at least one random
string and 6% belonged to Content Delivery Networks (CDN)
such as CDN77, CDNsun, KeyCDN, and MetaCDN.
Although the primary goal of CDNs is to provide high
availability of static content, scammers abuse them as a way
of obtaining free or near-free hosting for their scam pages.
Content Delivery Networks, such as, CDN77, CDNsun, and
KeyCDN offer free services without requiring a phone number
or a credit card. In addition, every uploaded scam page gets its
own random-string-including URL which can not be guessed
and thus cannot be preemptively blacklisted (blacklisting the
entire CDN-controlled domain would cause collateral damage).
Technical support scam domains are unusually long. A t-test
on the distribution of domain length of 8K scam domains (with
an average length of 76±56) and the top 8K Alexa domains
(with an average length of 12±3.5) results in a very small p-
value (p<0.05) which indicates that the difference is significant.
By inspecting a sample of the scam pages hosted on long scam
domains, we found that scammers make use of long domains
to, among others, evade the built-in mechanism of the browsers
for suppressing pop-ups. We discuss these techniques further
in Section IV-D.
The set of collected scam domains, after removing CDN
entries, maps to 1,524 TLD+1 domains resolving to 685 unique
IP addresses. This reduction in the size of hosting providers,
confirms the use of shared-hosting as a way of getting cheap
domains and hosting which can be easily changed to evade
blacklisting. The majority of scam-page hosting is done in the
US (88%), followed by a long tail of various countries, such as,
India and Netherlands. While India is not an obvious hosting
choice, we show that many scammers seem to be operating
var ran = false;
function loadNumber () {
if (!ran) {
// Default numbers in case script fails
var default_number = "(877) 292 -3084";
var default_plain_number = "8772923084";
// Initiates new instance of specific campaign
var campaign = new Callpixels.Campaign ({ campaign_key: ’
43019 bb72cd5ecc4e3b33902645dd4d6 ’});
// Script collects information about the user and the
affiliate ID of the scammer
var tags = {};
var source_host = ’https :// gyazo.com /714[...] b7915’;
var affiliate_id = ’1’;
var clickid = ’Rb10lsaOkY ’;
var browser = ’Firefox ’;
var browserversion = ’25.0’;
var country = ’US’;
var os = ’Windows ’;
[...]
// Populates an object with the gathered information
tags = {
a: affiliate_id ,
clickid: clickid ,
source_url: source_host ,
browser: browser ,
browserversion: browserversion ,
country: country ,
os: os,
[...]
};
// Function that retrieves a dynamic number
campaign.request_number(tags ,
function (matching_number) {
// Stores the dynamic number in global variable
number = matching_number.get(’formatted_number ’);
plain_number = matching_number.get(’plain_number ’);
window.callpixels_number = matching_number;
},
function (error) {
number = default_number;
plain_number = default_plain_number;
}
);
ran = true;
//Shows the new number to victim user
var number = "1 "+number;
FormattedNumber1.innerHTML = number;
[...]
}
window.onfocus = loadNumber ();
Fig. 5: Partial JavaScript code that shows the dynamic fetching of
a toll-free number based on the current victim’s attributes, and the
fallback logic in case the dynamic fetching fails.
out of it (Section V). We also mapped the IP addresses to
AS names and found that 18% of the scam hosts are using
Cloudflare to hide their hosting server.
Lastly, we focused on the WHOIS records of scam domains.
From the 1,524 TLD+1 domain names, we were able to
extract 1,055 (69.2%) email addresses. The difficulty of parsing
WHOIS data [28] was compounded by the fact that 344
domains did not even have an email address listed in their
WHOIS records. 589 email addresses belonged to multiple
WHOIS privacy companies which stopped us from identifying
common individuals behind different domains. By inspecting
the remaining 466 addresses we noticed patterns of simi-
lar names, such as, amitabb8@gmx.com, amitabb9@gmx.com,
amitapp1@gmx.com and amitabb6@gmail.com. To automati-
cally cluster these emails we used the Levenshtein distance
metric and grouped together addresses with a distance of
less than 5. This resulted in the formation of 192 clusters,
including 65 clusters with at least two email addresses and
6 with more than ten. The two largest clusters contained 60
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Fig. 6: Two samples of technical support scam campaigns. The
left graph shows the relationships between unique domains and
phone numbers. The right graph shows the relationship between
unique, TLD+1 domain names and phone numbers. Black and gray
nodes represent phone numbers and domain names/TLD+1 domains
respectively and size of a node is proportional to the node degree.
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Fig. 7: CDF of the lifetime of scam campaigns.
(united by supernetws[0-9]+@yahoo.com) and 27 (united by
charmssprince@gmail.com) domains respectively. Our results
highlight that even though scammers attempt to hide from
analysis systems, a large-enough corpus of scam domains may
still allow the grouping of seemingly unrelated scams.
C. Phone numbers and their relationship to domains
Since phone numbers are a crucial part of technical support
scams, we used a public database of toll-free numbers [29] to
get more information about them. There, we discovered that
even though the 1,581 toll-free numbers belong to 15 different
telecommunication providers, more than 90% belong to only
four providers (Twilio, WilTel, RingRevenue, and Bandwidth)
which indicates that scammers are abusing some providers
significantly more than others. Moreover, we discovered 77.5%
of the phone numbers were activated less than one year ago and
none of the vanity terms associated with the collected numbers
is related to tech support.
To gain insights on the N-N relationship between scam
domains and phone numbers appearing on scam pages, we
plotted their network graph. In this graph, an undirected edge
between a domain name and a phone number exists, if the
phone number was advertised by the domain name during the
time period of our experiment. The resulting graph contains
582 connected components of various sizes, of which 216
connected components have more than 5 nodes. A sample of
the connected components is depicted in Figure 6 (left). As one
can notice, the same numbers are reused across a set of domain
names and, vice-versa, a domain may advertise different phone
numbers over its lifetime.
To identify connected components which are more represen-
tative of scam campaigns, we merge the domain nodes that have
the same TLD+1 domain and replot the network graph. The
TABLE I: Characteristics of the top five campaigns. D: Domains, P:
Phone numbers
#D #P TLDs Prefixes #IPs/#ASs Country Top AS or
CDN
Lifetime
(days)
3714 93 net, com 855, 844,
888, 877
35/3 US, NL CloudFlare 64
513 96 biz, net,
com, in, us,
xyz, space,
website,
info, club,
online, me,
cf, ga, org,
co, tk, ca,
site
844, 877,
855, 866,
888, 800
93/20 US, IN,
FR
Cloudflare,
GoDaddy
250
173 359 space, info,
com, org,
net
888, 855,
844, 877
42/7 DE, FR,
US
cdn77,
cdnsun,
metacdn,
keycdn
235
145 164 info, help,
online,
website,
com, xyz,
in, net
888, 844,
877, 855,
800, 866
33/9 US, IN,
NL
Amazon 185
68 15 net, com,
org, info
844, 888 1/1 US 1 and 1 250
new graph contains 434 connected components while the phone
nodes and domain nodes have an average degree of 2.8 and
2.5 respectively. The maximum degree of phone nodes is 173,
and the maximum degree of domain nodes is 34. One sample
of a connected component in this graph which represents a
technical support scam campaign is plotted in Figure 6 (right).
One interesting characteristic of this subgraph is that the center
six phone numbers are connected to almost all of the campaign’s
domain names. After investigating these specific scam pages,
we discovered that these numbers are the default numbers that
would be used by the scam page in case an error happens
during the on-the-fly retrieval of a new phone number.
We estimate the life time of scam campaigns by adding
timestamps to the nodes of the network graph. We define the
lifetime of a campaign as the difference between the timestamps
of the first and last domain or phone number joined to the
subgraph of the campaign. As Figure 7 shows, the distribution
of campaigns’ lifetime is not normal and 69% of the campaigns
have a lifetime of less than 50 days. Even though the average
lifetime is 45 days, there are campaigns with a life time of
more than 250 days (the whole duration of our experiment).
Moreover, assuming that the size of a campaign is equal to the
size of its graph, there is a positive correlation (r=0.5) between
the lifetime of a campaign and its size. We can, therefore,
conclude, that larger technical support campaigns tend to be
active for a longer time.
Table I shows the characteristics of the five largest cam-
paigns and their estimated lifetime. The utilized toll-free pre-
fixes, TLDs and hosting infrastructure differs among campaigns
with the two first campaigns, besides having rich and diverse
infrastructures, hiding their hosting servers behind Cloudflare.
One can also see that many of these campaigns use cheap
TLDs, such as, .xyz, .space and .club, to generate many
variations of scam domains.
D. Page contents
Scammers use specific words in the content of a scam page
to convince the users that their machines are infected with a
virus. Figure 8 shows the most frequent words used in the
scam pages in the form of a word cloud, where the size of
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Fig. 8: Word cloud based on the text contents of the gathered technical
support scam pages
each word is correlated with the number of times it appeared
in our collected corpus of technical support scam pages.
Next to specific words, scammers also abuse browser APIs
to increase the effectiveness of their scams. In Section II, we
discussed how scammers abuse alert dialogues to make it
hard for users to navigate away. Some browsers, however, give
users the ability to suppress alert dialogues, if a page is
abusing them. For instance, in Google Chrome, if a page uses
two back-to-back alert dialogues, the browser adds to the
second alert dialogue, a checkbox that the user can check to
“Prevent this page from creating additional dialogs.” 49% of the
collected scams were using very long alert messages, padded
with whitespaces and new lines in an attempt to elongate the
alert dialogue to a point that the newly added checkbox would
be out of the user’s view. The rest were trying to bypass the
alert-dialogue threshold, by using multiple event handlers,
launching alert dialogues from each one, in combination with
the creation of new pop-up windows and subdomains. It is
also worthwhile to note that Internet Explorer does not offer
such a mechanism and thus a malicious webpage can keep on
launching alert dialogues without the user being able to stop
them, or navigate away while a dialogue is shown.
Lastly, we observed that 87% of the discovered scam pages
were using HTML audio tags, to automatically launch repeating
audio clips that either sounded like an alarm, or were text-to-
voice tracks, highlighting the severity of the problem and asking
the user to call the listed technical support number.
E. Sufficiency of existing blacklists
Technical support scams require both domain names as well
as (toll-free) phone numbers. As such, one could reason that, in
contrast with most other attacks where only malicious domains
are utilized, defenders have two chances to protect users via
blacklisting: one by blacklisting domains, and one more by
blacklisting phone numbers. We evaluate popular blacklists and
show that existing blacklisting efforts fall severely short of
capturing scam domains and phone numbers.
Domain blacklisting. First, we check our collected 1,524
TLD+1 scam domains against a combined set of popular
blacklists including hpHosts [30], suspicious domains by
SANS [31], malwaredomains [32], malwaredomainlist [33],
Malc0de database [34] and, abuse.ch [35]. We use snapshots
of these databases starting from 2014, which overall contain
Fig. 9: Screenshots of phone lookup mobile apps when receiving calls
from scam numbers: Should I Answer? (left), CallDetector (right)
records for approximately 370K domains and IP addresses.
Surprisingly, out of 1,524 scam domains, only 108 (7%) were
blacklisted. Moreover, out of the 108 blacklisted domains, only
16 were already blacklisted on the day that ROBOVIC first
detected them. The rest were blacklisted, on average, 38 days
after ROBOVIC’s detection. We also resolved the scam domains
and checked whether their IP addresses were blacklisted. From
the 685 resolved IP addresses, only 28 (4%) were already
present in one of the aforementioned blacklists.
Second, we repeat our experiment using VirusTotal’s domain
tools. There, we discovered that 974 of 1524 TLD+1 domains,
i.e., approx. 64%, were detectable by, on average, 3.25 AV
engines on VirusTotal. Since VirusTotal does not show the date
of first discovery of a malicious domain, we cannot calculate
the exact fraction of domains which ROBOVIC discovered
before AVs. Moreover, since VirusTotal houses 68 different
AV engines, we argue that the vast majority of AV users are
likely not going to be protected against technical support scams,
even if they are accessing one of the 974 domains that were
detectable by VirusTotal.
Phone blacklisting. There are different kinds of abuse possible
via phone calls, including spam, scam, and extortion. Conse-
quently, many phone-lookup services exist that keep databases
of malicious phone numbers. These databases are typically
crowdsourced relying on users to submit complaints. In recent
years, in addition to websites that users can utilize to look
up phone numbers, there exist mobile apps that give users
real-time information about a number that is calling them.
To assess whether these databases include phone numbers
involved in technical support scams, we scraped six websites
searching for complaints for any of our ROBOVIC-detected
1,581 phone numbers. Moreover, we investigated how well the
five most popular caller-id and fraud-protection Android apps
were able to detect technical support scam numbers.
To avoid reverse engineering each app, we opted to install
each app in an Android emulator and simulate calls originating
from each of the 1,581 scam-operated phone numbers. Some
apps provided a call log which showed whether any given caller
was a scammer (Figure 9 right). For these apps we simulated
batches of calls and inspected the number of detected scams
after each batch. For the apps that only showed a warning when
a user was receiving a call (Figure 9 left), our tools captured a
screenshot of the device during each simulated call and then
used perceptual hashing to create clusters of similar screenshots.
7
TABLE II: Presence of the collected 1,581 technical support scam
phone numbers in popular phone lookup databases: website searches
(white), mobile in-app alerts (gray)
Database % TSS numbers Claimed Size
mrnumber.com 19.9% 1.5 billion numbers
800notes.com 18.5% Unknown
numberguru.com 1.0% 29 million lookups
Should I Answer? 0.5% 640 million lookups
Truecaller 0.5% 2 billion numbers
Hiya 0.3% 100 million numbers
badnumbers.info 0.2% 968,639 complaints
CallDetector 0.1% 100,000 complaints monthly
callersmart.com 0.1% 5.9 million lookups
Mr. Number 0.1% 1.5 billion numbers
scamnumbers.info 0.1% 31,162 numbers
Together 27.4% Unknown
At the end of this process, we inspected the resulting clusters
and manually labeled them.
Table II presents the results. The best (in terms of coverage)
phone lookup websites cover less than 20% of technical
support scam phone numbers, and for both mrnumber.com
and 800notes.com, more than 25% of detected scam phone
numbers were, in fact, detected by ROBOVIC on average 44
days earlier (comparing the date of discovery with the date of
the earliest user complaint). Mobile apps perform significantly
worse with all apps detecting less than 1% of the 1,581 scammer-
operated phone numbers. Mr.Number is an interesting case since
the same company operates both the app as well as the website,
yet the app warned us only for two of the technical support
scam numbers. We suspect that this could be because of some
overly strict procedure for verifying user-submitted complaints
and converting them to warnings that users will see on their
device. Even worse, some phone numbers were identified by
mobile apps as legitimate “computer”, “windows”, or “repair”
businesses (even “Dell” or “McAfee”), “technical support”, or
“facebook support”, and “call centre” with positive reviews.
If users were to install all apps on their phones and inspect
all websites before making a call, they would still cover less
than 30% of our collected scam numbers. By analyzing the text
of complaints regarding known scam phone numbers on the
evaluated websites, we found evidence that some scam numbers
are also involved in other types of scams, including fake law
firms, debt collectors, and IRS scams. We found 10 such cases
on mrnumber.com and 24 on 800notes.com. In terms of apps,
Hiya app identified one of malicious numbers as an IRS scam.
F. Estimating the number of victims, their location, and
scammer profits
Although we did not have access to the scammers’ servers,
we took advantage of the misconfiguration of Apache servers
of some of the scam domains to collect data regarding their
visitors. Specifically, we noticed that some hosting servers of
technical support scam domains had enabled the mod status
module of Apache servers without restricting access to it.
This module provides an HTML page showing current server
statistics including clients’ requests, clients’ IP addresses, server
uptime, and total traffic [36].
ROBOVIC checked each discovered domain for the presence
of mod status module and appended those that were exposing
it to a list of domains that were crawled every minute by a
separate crawler. In this way, by collecting more than 50GB
of mod status data, we were able to monitor the activity
of 142 scam domains over a period of two months. By
analyzing the collected data, we discovered a total of 1,688,412
unique IP addresses visiting the monitored scam domains. On
average, each scam domain received a total of 11,890 visitors
(approximately 224 visitors per day). The maximum number
of visitors of a scam domain was 138,514 and many popular
domains had traffic originating from more than 68K unique IP
addresses.
By geolocating the IP addresses of the visiting users, we
identify the following five most popular countries: United States
(33.6%), Australia (25.36%), Singapore (22.40%), Canada (7%),
and New Zealand (4.8%). These results show that scammers
are currently mostly targeting English-speaking countries. Note
that this language-selection is a necessary property of technical
support scams since scammers must be able to fluently speak
the language of the victims who will contact them.
Assuming that the conversion rate for victims landing on
technical support scam pages (i.e. calling the listed phone
number and buying the technical support scam package offered
by the scammer) is the same as that of users paying for
the “full version” of a fake antivirus (approximately 2%, as
calculated by Stone-Gross et. al [6]), 33,768 of the 1,688,412
users have paid for unnecessary technical support. With the
average price of a technical support scam package being $290
(calculated in Section V-D), just for the 142 mod-status-
monitored domains, scammers have collected more than $9.7
million from unsuspecting users.
G. Summary of findings
By building a tool (ROBOVIC) that can take advantage
of malvertising in order to discover technical support scams,
we were able to witness the growth and dynamics of these
scams over an 8-month period. We found that scammers use
thousands of domains and phone numbers to scare victims into
calling them, and make use of blocking APIs and intrusive
techniques to stop users from navigating away from their
website. We showed that scams can be grouped into campaigns
and discovered that the most successful scammers were able to
work uninterrupted for the entire duration of our experiment.
We identified the TLDs and telecommunications companies
that are the most abused by scammers and found evidence of
on-the-fly phone-number delivery. Finally, we witnessed the
poor coverage of domain-name and phone-number blacklists
and estimated that, just for a fraction of the monitored domains,
scammers are likely to have made more than 9 million dollars
by defrauding unsuspecting victims.
V. INTERACTING WITH SCAMMERS
Even though the various measurements of the data collected
by ROBOVIC (presented in Section IV) can be used to better
understand the workings of technical support scam domains,
they provide no insights on what happens when victim users,
convinced that their machines are infected, call and interact
with technical support scammers.
To shed light into this final but crucial part of technical
support scams, in this section, we report on the data that we
collected by posing as technically unsavvy users and calling
60 technical support scammers, while recording our entire
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interactions with them. During those interactions, we discover
the way that scammers gain access to a user’s machine, the
methods and procedures that they use to convince the user of
the purported infection, the average duration of each call, and
the amount of money requested by each scammer.
A. Experiment Preparation
At its core, our study is an observational study. That is,
we do not seek to apply different treatments to scammers and
observe their effect. We merely seek to observe the methods
that they use in order to defraud an average individual, with
no security-related computer knowledge. Even though this
defrauding happens on a daily basis, we unfortunately have no
means of tapping into these conversations while they happen.
For this reason, we had to pose as victims and record our
interactions with the scammers.
IRB Approval. Since scammers are human subjects, we applied
to our institute’s IRB and got permission to perform these
recorded calls. Our approved application allows us to make use
of deception (we are not revealing our true identities or intent
to the scammers) and waive the requirement of consent (we
do not ask the scammers whether they want to participate in
our study). In addition, we convinced the IRB to allow us to
avoid debriefing the scammers at the end of each call, to avoid
information sharing from the side of the scammers that would
place suspicion on future calls. Since scammers are already
having these conversations with victims on a daily basis, our
study does not incur any risk to their emotional, psychological,
or physical wellbeing.
Observed Environment. The very first action that scammers
perform after a victim user calls them, is convince the victim
to give them remote access to their operating system. For our
purposes, we made use of virtualization, where an installation
of a Microsoft Windows 7 operating system was executing
inside a Type-2 hypervisor. The use of virtualization not only
allowed us to fully isolate a scammer’s actions from critical
infrastructure, but to also roll-back to a clean state of our
operating system, after the end of each call.
To ensure that our VMs look like realistic user systems,
we artificially aged our virtual machine, by installing different
applications, downloading images and documents and placing
them on the Windows desktop, and browsing many popular
video sites, gaming sites, and news sites. We changed our
system clock between different sets of actions so that some
of our actions would appear to have occurred in the past, e.g.,
the timestamps of installed programs and files, and the dates
available in our browsing history, placed these actions up to two
years before the beginning of our experiment. Since we limited
our visits and downloads to popular websites and applications,
we are confident that our virtual environments were free from
malware. Finally, we also removed obvious tell-tale signs of our
virtualization environment by changing the appropriate Registry
keys and the configuration of our virtual machine [37].
B. Data Sources and Data Collection
To select the phone numbers of technical support scammers,
we randomly sampled the pages that ROBOVIC discovered and
ensured that we did not call any number more than once. Note
that ROBOVIC discovers technical support scam pages which
claim that users are infected and flood the user with alert boxes,
in an attempt to make the user unable to navigate away from
the scam website. As such, we are confident that we never
called a legitimate technical support number.
We used VoIP software with conversation-recording capa-
bilities, packet-capturing software residing outside the VM for
capturing the network traffic of our virtualized OS, and host-
OS-residing screen recording software, for recording the visible
actions of scammers, once they were given access to our VMs.
After the collection of data from 60 different technical support
scam calls, and the calculation of the statistics described in
this section, we anonymized all copies of the collected data
according to our IRB protocol.
C. Script for our interactions
Throughout our calls, we pretended to be average computer
users who can use their PCs but have no computer knowledge
beyond that. For example, we pretended not to know what
an IP address is and, while we knew that having a virus is
bad, we pretended not to know exactly what a virus does on
our computer. We allowed the scammers to remotely connect
to our system, following their instructions to the letter, and
acted with shock, each time that a scammer would interpret
something on our screens as the result of malware. Shortly after
each scammer presented us with the pricing of his services, we
either abruptly ended our calls, or found an excuse to politely
hang-up. We never contradicted the scammers except during
the last ten calls in order to discover how scammers react when
users inform them that they are not convinced.
In a typical instantiation of this type of scam, once a victim
calls the scammer and explains to him why she is calling,
the scammer takes over the conversation. As such, we argue
that even if each call is slightly different than the rest, the
overall obtained results are aggregatable and generalizable to
the population of technical support scam sessions. To quantify
this phenomenon, we utilized a professional audio transcription
service [38] to obtain the text of five randomly selected calls.
The average number of words spoken by scammers in each call
is 1,367±407, whereas the average number of words from the
victims (ourselves) is 530±172. In addition to the scammers
speaking, on average, almost three times as much as the victims,
the standard deviation also shows that regardless of the exact
call, the variation of our answers was small compared to the
variation of the scammers questions.
Lastly, we want to point out that we did not pay any
scammer and therefore are unable to study scammers, after
they have charged users for unnecessary services. We chose not
to pay scammers primarily for ethical reasons. As described
later in this section, the average amount of money that a
scammer requests is almost $300. To get statistically significant
numbers, we would have to pay at least 30 scammers and thus
put approximately $9,000 in the hands of cybercriminals, a
fraction of which would, almost certainly, be used to fund new
malvertising campaigns and attract new victims.
D. Results
Remote administration tools Before a scammer can start
convincing users that their machines are infected with malware,
he must somehow get remote access to a user’s machine. To
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TABLE III: Remote Administration Tools used by scammers for getting
access to their victims’ machines
Remote Administration
Tool Websites Scammer abuse
LogMeIn Rescue
www.support.me
60%www.lmi1.com
www.logmein123.com
CITRIX GoToAssist www.fastsupport.com 21%
TeamViewer www.teamviewer.com 12%Scammer-controlled
Other www.anydesk.com 7%
www.gethelp.us
www.supremocontrol.com
TABLE IV: Techniques used by support scammers in order to convince
their victims of a malware infection
Technique % Calls
Stopped Services/Drivers 67
Event Viewer 52
Specific Virus Explained 50
System Information 47
Action Center 40
Fake CMD Scan 40
Netstat Scan 40
Installed/Running Programs 35
Browsing History/Settings 27
Downloaded Scanner 17
Reliability/Performance 15
Other (Temp, Registry) 13
that extent, the scammer must guide the user into downloading,
installing, and allowing a remote administration tool which he
will then use for his “support” session.
Table III shows the most popular tools abused by scammers
for connecting to our machines. LogMeIn Rescue and CITRIX
GoToAssist are web applications where a user visits one
of the websites listed in Table III, enters a code given by
the scammer over the phone and downloads a binary that
will eventually allow the attacker to remotely access a user’s
machine. TeamViewer and AnyDesk are stand-alone programs
that a user must download and execute. Once the programs
are running, both programs show a customer number and a
PIN that a user must provide to the scammer in order for the
scammer to connect to the user’s machine.
In all cases, the scammers were abusing legitimate web
applications and programs as part of their scams. Most of
the aforementioned companies seem to be aware of this
phenomenon and warn their users, typically through their
websites, not to allow remote connections from people they do
not trust. When these messages are pronounced, as in the case
of TeamViewer, scammers incorporated these messages into
their narratives in order to put us at ease. Other scammers,
chose to self-host older versions of the programs that did
not include these messages, thereby avoiding the warnings
altogether.
Utilized social-engineering techniques. The scammers used a
variety of techniques to convince us of the purported infections
and the need to purchase their support packages. Table IV
shows the most popular techniques used and the percentage
of scammers that used each technique. We provide a brief
explanation of the techniques that are not self-explanatory:
• Stopped Services/Drivers. 67% of scammers loaded the
list of Windows services and showed us that many services
were stopped. While this is the normal state of a Windows OS
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Fig. 10: Heatmap showing the conditional probability (ranging from
white to black) of the ten most often used social engineering methods.
Note that because, in general, P (A|B) 6= P (B|A) the heatmap is
not symmetric along its diagonal.
installation, the scammers claimed that hackers have stopped
these services and that is why they were able to get access to
our machines.
• Event Viewer. Event Viewer is one of the administrative tools
of Windows that shows general information about a system
that could be used for troubleshooting purposes. The scammers
treated the errors shown by this tool as a sign of hacker activity.
• Virus details. Some scammers, would conclude that our
system is infected by specific malware, such as “koobface” or
“Zeus.” They would then proceed to navigate our browser to
pages explaining these threats and asked us to read out loud
the section of each post describing the damage that the specific
piece of malware does to its infected hosts.
• Netstat scan. 40% of scammers utilized the netstat utility
to convince us that our machine is already occupied by hackers.
Specifically, they claimed that each non-local, TCP connection
listed in the output of netstat was an attacker who had either
already connected to our machine (entries with an ESTABLISHED
status), or was currently trying to connect (entries with a
TIME WAIT status).
• Fake CMD scan. One of the more creative techniques was
the use of verbose command-line utilities as fake virus scanners.
40% of the scammers utilized a command such as ‘‘dir /s’’
which lists files and folders present on a specific path of the
filesystem. While the program is producing output, the scammer
types or copy-pastes text in the command-line window, that will
only appear after the program is done executing. As such, at the
end of the program’s execution, the user suddenly sees text that
claims that a virus has been discovered which he is likely to
attribute to the “scanning” program that was just executing. This
technique is likely one of the most convincing ones because i)
it does not need interpretation (common messages used were
“Virus detected” and “System at Risk”) and ii) as far as the
user is concerned, it is his own operating system that produces
this message, rather than a downloaded third-party tool.
• Performance. Many scammers used system information tools
to discover the type of CPU and amount of RAM available to
our system. They then praised the hardware of our machine
before proceeding to search for infections. This was typically
done to convince us that spending money for the removal of
malware was worth the cost since it would allow us to keep
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Fig. 11: Distribution of the time duration between the beginning of
a call, and the time when technical support scammers presented us
with the pricing options for their services
using our machine for many years before we would need to
purchase a new one.
Overall, while we were able to identify techniques commonly
used by scammers, we were impressed with the scammers’
creativity in finding status messages that were already present
on our system and attaching an infection meaning to them. Fig-
ure 10 shows how often scammers used two social engineering
techniques together. There, we use the recorded frequencies to
calculate their respective conditional probabilities.
Duration of calls. Figure 11 shows the distribution of the time
duration between the beginning of a technical support scam
call, and the time when a scammer offered his services in
exchange for money. The average duration of that interval is
17 minutes, and the distribution is approximately normal. In
only a few cases, the scammers first told us the amount of
money that they will be charging (around the second and third
minute of our conversation) and then proceeded to “diagnose”
our machine.
Overall, one can see that the scammers are by no means in
a hurry to convince users and defraud them. They take their
time to slowly guide their victims into installing a remote
administration tool, clicking through all the security dialogues,
and giving them access to their machines. Once they have
access, they slowly work their way through different Windows
tools, showing their output to users and interpreting that output
for them. It is likely that scammers know that the more time
they take to convince a user about an infection, the more
successful they will be when they ask for a compensation
for their services. Figure 11 also provides an indication of
the amount of work necessary in order to obtain real-world
data from technical support scam calls. Specifically, for the
60 calls recorded and analyzed, we spent, during a one-month
period, more than 1,300 minutes (22 hours) just interacting
with scammers, excluding dropped calls, out-of-order numbers,
analysis of the recordings, and verification of our findings.
Since scammers control the vast majority of the conversa-
tion, we opine that the distribution of time shown in Figure 11
will be generalizable to the population of victims. Therefore,
this distribution can be of immediate value to telcos and the
FTC. Specifically, given a list of numbers operated by scammers,
telcos can straightforwardly produce metadata of their customer
base that has called any one of the numbers of technical
support scams. The FTC can then prioritize take-down action by
focusing on the scammers with whom victims were interacting
for more than 41 minutes, that is, the mean of our distribution
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Fig. 12: Requested charges for repairing our purportedly infected
machines. Since most scammers offered us more than one support
packages, we plot the ECDFs for minimum, average, and maximum
amount requested.
plus three standard deviations. Since the duration distribution
is approximately normal, the mean ± three standard deviations
should capture approximately 99.7% of all pre-charge calls. As
such, anyone interacting for more than 41 minutes, is likely a
defrauded victim.
Price of services. Once scammers felt confident that we were
convinced that we are in need of their help, they then informed
us about the price of their services. Most scammers offered us
two to three different options with support packages ranging
from a one-time fix, to multi-year support, ranging anywhere
from $69.99 to $999.99. Figure 12 shows the ECDF of the
amount requested, split in its minimum, average, and maximum
(average for any given scammer is the average price of all
offered support packages). The average support price across
all support packages and all scammers is $290.9 with most
scammers staying under $500 for all of their support packages.
The prices of support packages were structured in a way
where the middle one made the most financial sense. In fact,
the times that we pretended to be willing to purchase their
support and requested the cheapest option, the scammers would
typically try to reason with us that the middle one was a better
value-for-money offer. Interestingly, the price of services did
not correlate with the time that scammers spend convincing us
of our supposed infection (Pearson r=0.11).
Freelance scammers vs organized call centers. At the outset
of our study, we did not know whether technical support
scammers are individual freelancers who supplement their
income by single-handedly operating a technical support scam,
or are part of an organized call center. Through the process of
interacting with 60 different scammers, we are now convinced
that most, if not all, scammers are part of organized call centers.
Next to anecdotal evidence that we gathered during our
interactions (e.g. on one occasion, due to technical difficulties
with our VoIP software, we called the same number three times
in a row, and were greeted by a different person all three
times), we conducted the following experiment: We replayed
each recorded call and, instead of focusing on the scammer
talking to us, we instead focused on background noises. While
some scammers muted their microphones when they were not
speaking, the majority did not. On 62% of our calls, we were
able to hear other people in the background, often recognizing
phrases about security and malware that the scammer had just
used in his own narrative. Therefore, our results indicate that
the majority of scammers work in call centers, a fact which
is corroborated by a recent interview of a technical support
scammer on Reddit [39].
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Estimating the size of call centers. Motivated by the finding
that the majority of scammers operate out of call centers, we
wanted to estimate the size of these call centers, i.e., how many
scammers are “hiding” behind a single toll-free phone number.
To this end, we gathered 20 volunteers and explained to
them the concept of technical support scams, the methods
that scammers use, and the typical narratives of conversations
with scammers. Each volunteer was given ten toll-free phone
numbers operated by scammers (randomly selected by our
pool of numbers) and a list of fake personae which they could
assume when talking to the scammers (in our experience the
majority of scammers request the caller’s name and address
before proceeding). The ten toll-free numbers were the same
for all volunteers and they were instructed, guided by our
signals and a projected stopwatch, to start calling each number
at the same time. Each volunteer was instructed to engage with
each toll-free number for a period of 90 seconds, either by
talking to a scammer, or by waiting in a calling queue, or by
redialing a busy number. Under the reasonable assumption that
a scammer cannot be speaking to two people at the same time,
this experiment essentially allowed us to estimate a lower bound
of the size of a call center by counting the number of volunteers
that were able to reach a scammer (either immediately or after
waiting in a queue) in the measured 90-second period.
The average number of volunteers who were able to speak
with a scammer across all ten studied phone numbers was
11, with the smallest call-center housing 5 scammers, and the
largest one 19. Our results show that scammers can belong
to various operations, ranging from small scale ones (call
centers with 5 or 6 people) all the way to call centers that
essentially occupied all of our volunteers (call centers with 18
or 19 people). As before, we argue that our method can be
straightforwardly operationalized by the FTC and other law-
enforcement agencies, for identifying the largest players in the
technical support scam ecosystem, and focusing on them first.
Scammer Location. Even though scammers access a user’s
machine via a remote administration tool that typically involves
a centralized server relaying commands between the user and
the scammer, it is possible that some tools still leak the
scammer’s real IP address to the user. To discover whether
the remote administration tools utilized by scammers fit that
description, we installed the tools on our machines and
connected to them from another known IP address, while
capturing the network traffic. We then analyzed the traces
from our own connections and created packet signatures that
reveal the connecting user’s IP address.
Using this method, we recovered the IP address of 41 out
of the 60 support scams. By geolocating these IP addresses, we
discovered that 85.4% of them were located in different regions
of India, 9.7% were located in the US, and 4.9% were located
in Costa Rica. While we cannot know with certainty that the
scammers were not using VPNs located in these countries,
we argue that they most likely are not since the recovered IP
addresses do not belong to known VPN providers but rather to
residential and corporate ISPs. In addition, the accent of the
vast majority of the speakers with whom we interacted was
Indian, matching our geolocation results. We reason that India
is the most prevalent country, not only because of the relatively
low average wage [40], but also because India is already a
popular choice for outsourcing call centers of English-speaking
countries [41], [42]. Consequently, we do not know whether
the people running these call centers are the responsible ones,
or are merely working for a third-party scammer who has
outsourced the last part of the scams to them.
Scammer Demeanor. In general, scammers exhibited a kind
demeanor. They would patiently guide us through the steps
for downloading their remote administration tool, giving us
step-by-step instructions for the entire process. They would
take no computer knowledge for granted, even to the point of
explaining us that the Windows key is the one that “looks like
a flag”, between the Ctrl-key and the Alt-key on the bottom
left of our keyboard. More than one scammer, after having
explained to us that we are infected with malware, would open
up Wikipedia pages trying to educate us of the meaning of
words, such as, “trojan” and “koobface.”
To quantify how a scammer’s behavior changes when
faced with an expert user, in the last ten of our calls, after
the scammers showed us “signs” of infection and offered
their services in return for money, we contradicted them by
explaining that we did not believe them. 60% of the scammers
remained calm and polite, and tried to convince us of the
legitimacy of their company by showing us their websites and
other online information. The remaining 40% became rude and
soon after that terminated the call, with one scammer setting a
password to our virtualized OS before logging out.
E. Summary of findings
Through our interactions for over 22 hours with 60 scam-
mers, we were able to precisely quantify many aspects of
this last part of technical support scams. We discovered that
scammers abuse popular remote administration tools (81% of
scammers rely on two specific software products), to gain
access to user machines where they then patiently attempt to
convince users that they are infected with malware. We found
that, on average, a scammer takes 17 minutes, using multiple
social engineering techniques mostly based on misrepresenting
OS messages, to convince users of their infections and then
proceeds to request an average of $290.9 for repairing the
“infected” machines. We explained why we are convinced
that most scammers operate out of call centers, estimated the
size of an average call center, and, using geolocation of the
collected network traces, we found that scammers are likely to
be operating out of some specific countries, more than others.
VI. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
Given our findings in Sections IV and V, we argue that
technical support scams are a real and dangerous threat to the
modern web. In contrast with other cybercrime methods, such
as the stealing of credit card numbers and banking credentials,
technical support scams do not need any additional monetization
effort since, if the scam is effective, the victimized users will be
willingly accepting the charges and voluntarily providing their
private and financial information, over the phone, to scammers.
Even though systems that can automatically discover and
detect these scams as soon as they arise, like ROBOVIC, are
crucial, we opine that the threat of technical support scams
can only be comprehensively subdued with the education of
the public and additional help from browser vendors. In this
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section, we briefly describe these two areas of intervention and
discuss the limitations of our work.
User Education. User education has been a long-standing
problem of security mechanisms and its lack has often been
abused by attackers through social engineering. While certain
problems, e.g., the expiration of an SSL certificate, or the
problem of mixed inclusions, are admittedly hard to explain to
a non-technical person, we argue that explaining the concept of
technical support scams, is an easier endeavor. This is because,
in technical support scams, there are no exceptions that the
user must remember. A webpage cannot, by browser design,
know that a user is infected and should never be using a flood
of alerts with threatening messages to communicate with users.
As such, educating the public that these pages should not be
trusted is highly unlikely to cause harm to legitimate businesses,
even the ones involved in remote technical support.
Public service announcements are already used by multiple
countries as a way of raising awareness for health and safety
issues, and would be an ideal vehicle for educating users
about the dangers and characteristic signs of technical support
scams. Even though the Internet Crime and Complaint Center
called its warning of technical support scams a “Public Service
Announcement” [1], the announcement was only available via
specific websites and thus far from the reach of the general
population. At the same time, even though non-technical people
can be educated to recognize technical support scams, we must
also provide them with a simple way of navigating their browser
to safety, away from webpages that abuse blocking, browser-
provided APIs, such as the alert function, to keep users from
navigating away.
Browser Support. Given our reliance on the web, modern
browsers try to provide high availability to users and a large
degree of control to websites. In addition to blocking UIs, one
specific feature that is, in general, desirable but has inadvertently
become a tool in the hands of scammers is the remembering of
open tabs in the case of a crash. Specifically, if we assume that,
a non-technical user is trapped on a technical support scam
page and, in a moment of desperation, reboots his machine,
the browser will remember all the open tabs, including the one
with the technical support scam, upon reboot. As such, the user
will still be trapped and much more likely to call the scammers.
Trying to outrun alert dialogues or killing the browser process
and clearing recent history should not be something that we
expect from everyday users.
To help users navigate to safety, we propose that browser
vendors could all adopt one universal shortcut that users can
utilize when they feel threatened by a webpage. Depending on
the design, the browser can choose either to immediately close
the current tab, or close all tabs and navigate the browser to a
known safe page. The browser should ignore all event handlers
and provide no way that a webpage could detect its unloading
in time to launch a new window of the intruding webpage.
Ideally, this shortcut combination would be communicated to
the public through the aforementioned PSAs, allowing users
to both recognize and defend against technical support scams.
Lastly, we want to point out that such a shortcut could be useful
beyond technical support scams, helping users quickly navigate
away from websites that they find intrusive, such as shock sites,
as well as helping them defend against any webpage that is
trying to forcefully keep them from navigating away.
Limitations. We identify two limitations of our work: i) the
potential evasion of ROBOVIC’s detection heuristics, and ii)
the non-completeness of our sources for discovering technical
support scam domains.
First, we are well aware that, since we are operating in
an adversarial environment, scammers may, as a result of
our work, change their tactics to evade ROBOVIC’s current
detection heuristics. Note, however, that scammers do not have
unlimited freedom in the techniques that they can use. Namely,
if scammers want to trap a user’s browser, they must identify
blocking APIs (such as the currently abused alert method) and
utilize those. Therefore, while an attacker could, for instance,
use Flash to communicate their message (and therefore avoid
matching our keyword-based heuristics) they would risk users
just closing the offending tab. To account for language-based
evasions, we are currently experimenting with a supervised
machine-learning-based classifier, similar to the ones used for
detecting spam. The premise is that the language that scammers
use (consisting of warnings, errors, threats, and viruses) is
different than the language of a typical webpage. We leave the
discussion of this classifier and its accuracy for future work.
Second, we cannot unfortunately provide any guarantees of
completeness of our malvertising-driven discovery approach.
Such a guarantee would require information about the entire
population of scammers and their traffic-delivering techniques,
something that is likely infeasible. We chose to approach this
problem pragmatically, by identifying malvertising as a key
component of modern malware delivery and focusing on that.
The presence of tens of different domain-parking and url-
shortening services allows us to tap into multiple advertising
networks which, in turn, exchange ads with even more smaller
networks. We argue that since ROBOVIC is able to discover so
much more than exists in current blacklists (as measured in
Section IV-E), we are, in fact, discovering a sizeable chunk of
the true population of technical support scams.
VII. RELATED WORK
Our study was inspired by a series of blog posts and a
whitepaper from an antimalware company which qualitatively
analyzed technical support scams [3]–[5]. While these, and
other blog posts have, in the past, analyzed a handful of scams,
their studies are ad-hoc and their results are not generalizable.
To our knowledge, no blog post has ever produced a repeatable
methodology for finding scam pages in the wild, assessed the
sufficiency (or lack thereof) of existing URL and phone-number
blacklists, estimated the number of victims and the amount of
money lost, or clustered phone numbers and their respective
domains, all using a corpus of thousands of domain names
and phone numbers. Similarly, because of the ad-hoc nature
of their interviews with scammers, no one has ever reported
the distribution of the time that scammers take, the size of an
average call center, or the amount of money that they charge, all
of which can be of immediate use for prioritized take-downs.
In contrast with the aforementioned studies, our work is
the first systematic, quantitative study investigating technical
support scams, by i) designing and deploying a distributed
crawling infrastructure for an 8-month period, ii) using this
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infrastructure to identify thousands of domains and phone
numbers and analyzing their underlying infrastructure, and iii)
conducting a controlled, IRB-approved experiment to obtain
precise information about the social engineering techniques
used by scammers and statistics about the process, the tools
used, the call-center infrastructures, and the amounts charged.
Though we are not aware of other work that has investigated
technical support scams, we argue that these scams are a cross-
over between traditional scareware, and scams perpetrated over
the telephone [43] instead of over the Internet, such as vishing
(Voice Phishing). In a more general sense, our paper belongs to
the literature studying cybercrime and underground ecosystems
aiming to shine light on hidden mechanisms, affiliate structures,
infrastructure abuse, and possible technical and economical
disruptions [7], [27], [44]–[47].
Scareware. Scareware refers to software, typically fake AVs,
which attempt to scare the user into performing one or more
harmful actions. Cova et al. [48] tracked 6,500 domains involved
in the distribution of fake AVs and discovered that 65% of the
web servers behind these domains were exclusively serving
malicious content. The authors clustered multiple fake AVs as
part of the same campaign, with the largest campaign being
responsible for 23.5% of the 6,500 tracked domains. Rajab
et al. [49] use Google’s SafeBrowsing data to discover over
11,000 domains offering fake AVs with up to 90% of the
discovered scams relying on social engineering for getting
installed on a user’s computer. Stone-Gross et al. [6] approach
the phenomenon of fake antivirus software from an economic
angle. The authors show that fake AV scammers can earn
hundreds of millions of dollars in antivirus license fees and
discover the presence of affiliate networks where scammers
are paid a commission for each fake AV installation. Dietrich
et al. [50] describe how perceptual hashing could be used to
automatically cluster malware that depend on visual interfaces
including fake antivirus programs and ransomware [51].
Telephone Scams. Maggi performed the first study of vishing
by analyzing the data submitted by 360 users who had fallen
pray to vishing attacks and were willing to recount their
experience [52]. In a later study, Costin et al. [53] investigated
the role of phone numbers in cybercrime and used phone
numbers to cluster different types of scams, using data from
another crowdsourced website listing scams. The authors
utilized HRL (Home Register Location) queries and showed
that the average scammer kept, almost always, their phone
online. Unfortunately, HRL queries are only applicable to
mobile phones, thus we cannot utilize them for tracking toll-free
numbers. Christin et al. [54] analyzed a type of scam that was
mostly targeting Japanese users by threatening to reveal their
adult browsing habits if they would not pay a certain amount of
money to scammers. Among others, the authors took advantage
of the phone numbers made available by scammers in order to
cluster multiple scams as part of larger campaigns. Note that
in all three studies, the authors used publicly available data to
perform their analyses. Contrastingly, in this paper, because of
the absence of available datasets, we designed and developed
ROBOVIC, the first tool able to automatically discover hundreds
of instances of technical support scams on a weekly basis.
Gupta et al. described the architecture of a phone honeypot
and presented the intelligence gathered by deploying 40K phone
numbers which attracted 1.3 million calls over a period of seven
weeks [55]. The authors discovered that older phone numbers
attracted a higher number of calls than newer phone numbers,
and showed how the rate of calling can be used to differentiate
between different types of unwanted calls, e.g., the ones done by
a telemarketer, versus a debt collector. While their system could,
in principle, be used to discover the older variant of technical
support scams (where unsuspecting users receive unsolicited
calls from scammers), the type of technical support scams that
we investigated in this paper needs an active component, such
as ROBOVIC, to actively discover pages and numbers.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we reported on the first systematic investiga-
tion of technical support scams. By designing and implementing
the first system capable of automatically discovering technical
support scams, we collected a corpus of thousands of unique
domains and telephone numbers engaged in technical support
scams, clustered them in campaigns, and showed that scammers
abuse specific browser APIs to make it hard for users to navigate
away from a technical support scam page. By interacting with
60 different scammers for more than 22 hours, we precisely
identified the social engineering techniques used, the remote
administration tools abused, and the amount of money that
scammers are charging. We presented evidence that places
technical support scammers in call centers in English-speaking
countries with low wages, showing that the ecosystem of
technical support scams is complex and comprised of more than
one parties. Lastly, we discussed the need for user education
and proposed a simple feature that browser vendors could adopt
to assist users in navigating away from malicious pages.
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